



OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT NEEDS AND
THE WORLD WHEAT PROBLEM TODAY
Paper prepared for delivery at the International Wheat
Surplus Utilization Conference, July 20-August 2, 1958
Proceedings to be published early in 1959
by
Wilfred Malenbaum
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts
November 1958
OVERSEAS DEVEIPMENT NEEDS AND
THE WORLD WHEAT PROBIEM TODAY
Paper prepared for delivery at the International Wheat




Currently, year-end wheat carryovers in the major exporting
countries, essentially world carryovers, stand at or near record levels,
absolutely and relative to annual wheat utilization. The present imbal-
ance, against a long background of past imbalances, justifies the com-
plaints that basic factors of production are somehow misallocated within
a nation, perhaps among nations; that consumers in these countries bear
an oppressive, unnecessary economic burden. All this warrants continued
study of world wheat problems and their possible solution. However, the
bulk of the burden of the imbalance falls upon the people of two countries,
the United States and Canada, with the highest per capita incomes in the
world. What if the same statistical picture weighed upon the people of
South East Asia, the usual major supplier of basic agricultural and raw
materials to the world? How much more able are our industrialized countries
to bear these burdens than are nations which are primarily agricultural,
with per capita incomes less than one-tenth ours, at the maximumg
This anomaly of huge agricultural surpluses in the economically most
advanced lands allows a better perspective on the itabalancos in the world
wheat picture0 For it is precisely these imbalances which have made pos-
sible some of man's noblest deeds of recent times0 It was the product of
2an imbalanced wheat econorgy of the early forties which provided strength to
liberated peoples throughout the world, which nurtured the postwar rehabil'.-
tation of important parts of Europe and Asia. Today's imbalanced w eat ecat-
omy plays a vital role in the development struggle of the poor lands of the
world.
Without these imbalances we seek so hard to remedy, postwar world ecosm
omic and political development may have taken a different course -- and I
would argue one which was less satisfactory to us as citizens of great demo.
cratic nations. Admittedly, granting all this scarcely justifies the precise
way that the wheat surpluses have been allowed to develop and the precise
way their burdens have been distributed. Still, I'm hard pressed to see, !x
ot, just how we could have met these postwar problems had we been more suo.
cessful in dealing with the prewar and wartime political and economic problems
of wheat in the United States and Canada.
Nor am I saying that the Marshall Plan, to say naught of today's
requirements for overseas development, can be dealt with through our
wheat surpluses alone. Wheat was and is of great economic importance,
but the need exists not only for other food products, but for a large
variety of raw materials and products of industry. In the present
context, it is more relevant that wheat is of the greatest psychological
import. As a nation of people, we are fortunately more humane than rational.
Thus our wheat surpluses do constitute a real spur to international action,
while a general economic recession scarce3y provides a comparable stimulus.
Today, the world is confronted with a crisis of underdevelopment .
the nature, intensity and import of which we are only beginning to recog-
nise, In my view, it is fortunate that the degree of wheat imbalance is
3greater than ever, both because our wheat surpluses can play a signaficant
economic role and mostly because they may provide the spur to actiop of
the requisite kind and o- der of magnitude. I would like here to expand these
ideas to some extent (I7). Finally, (III) I would like to suggest that we
give some f.arther thon-,ht to the problems of "institutionalizing" the imba3r.
anced wheat economy, :ather than rectifying it. Perhaps there is some para-
llel for a world whi at foundation (or a "surplus" food bank, or the like) in
the Rockefeller Fc andation or in the Ford Foundation, Would the world todar
be better off if John D. Rockefeller or Henry Ford had been less successful
in amassing mi'.lions? If it is relatively easy to overproduce wheat, and
if we as nat.ons can afford to bear the costs involved, why not continue?
The specia', unpredictable needs of our world seem to have been of growing
importan-i; who can know what is yet to come?
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lost of the world is poor. Based essentially on UN statistics, almost
60 pr cent of all the people live in countries where average annual incomes
are less than $100 per capita. These countries :are all in Asia and Africa.
Aier generous adjustment to take account of the diffifuItles of inter-
r tional comparison of levels of living, it is safe to say that these
sople conduct their lives on the basis of a current flow iof material
goods and services which averages below, well below, 10 per cent
that of the people in Canada and the United States. Were comparison made
by income groupings rather than by national averages, the low income
population ratios would mount significantly.. to include millions :
of people more in Latin America, and even Europe, as well as those in
Africa and Asia. It is a familiar parador ttat the majority of these
'4
ow income Peopl..., perhaps 70 per cent to 80 per cent W.are farmers and
mostly grain farmers0 The nations where the bulk of the working popula-
tion is in 4griculture .. where agriculture is devoted principally to the
production of basic energy foods..fill the lower rungs of the world's
national income ladder. There one finds concentrated the broad and con-
tinuing nutrlitional deficiencies of the world.
This brief statement of the present world income position is quite a
familiar one. What is less familiar, however, is the great probability
that the present pattern of world income distribution is significantly more
favorable to the poorer lands than it will be 20 to 25 years from now.;...-
given the present policies in the world's nations, both poor and rich. Efforts
are indeed being made to mitigate hunger and starvation; the provision of
foreign aid, including wheat shipments, is making some contribution to econ-
omic growth and industrialization. But the actions taken to date have not
even begun to deal with the problem, especially in Asia and Africa. Some
progress has taken place in Latin America, although this is confined to a
few countries.
It is realistic to expect national income in the countries of North
America, Australia and New Zealand, Western Europe, the Soviet Union and
and ivsi o? it European satellites - all together and indeed in each of
them separately:,a to grow at a rate of 3-4 per cent, or even more per year,
as they have in the recent past. With present and probable rates of popula-
tion growth, this more developed part of the world .say with 25 per cent
of its people todayg. can continue to look forward to a growth in per capita
income averaging between 2 and 3 per cent over the next few decades. There
is no basis for assuming that a h per cent annual growth rate will apply to
the rest of the world's countries, or indeed to many of them, given present
trends and policies. Moreover, while these countries together may today
have about the same rates of natural increase in population as do the weal-
thier lands, this can be expected to be less true from now on. The patterns
of birth and death rates underlying the Dresent equality are very different
in the two groups of lands. With today's trends in death rates in the poorer
nations, population there will begin to increase at correspondingly greater
rates, at least for a period. Taken together, present forces shaping output
and population growth are tending to widen the relative gap between per
capita income levels in the two groups. This does not of course preclude
the possibility that per capita incomes will grow in today's underdeveloped
countries..jalbeit at lower rates than in the wealthier lands.
I won' t develop this argument further here. I find it hard to visualize
resource discovery or new process devclopment or application anywhere, even
with a time-horizon of at least 20 to 25 years, which would alter this gloou
prospect...,at least without major new lines of action. But there will be
some such new lines.. and this is why we cannot afford not to be highly
motivated to the rates 6f growth elsewhere. For, while population and out-
put growth hold these prospects for stagnation, political developments will
inject forces for change. So rapid and thorough has become the international
transmission of ideas that we can increasingly expect demands from the poorer
lands for rectification of these "unjust" trends, These are not apt to*
arise spontaneously from popula4 "revQlutions of rising expectations": people
long inured to suffering and privation are not readily moved to revolt. :
6Rather, pressures for change will come more pointedly from the elites in
these countries, in the governments themselves, or in the would-be gov-
ernments. More rapidly than will the rest of the people, these leaders
can be expected to become aware that present output trends are not bring-
ing the hope and promise available elsewhere.
Where will they turn to find their models for change? Less to the
more developed countries, I submit, than to areas where progress is in
fact occuring among themselves. Certainly less in the democratic nations
which have so long talked of development assistance, but Vhich can provide
few evidences of development progress from this assistance. Vast millions
of dollars in goods and services have been provided in aid, but there is
little indication that forces have been set in motion that will result in
continuing expansions in per capita product in the recipient countries of
Afrida dr of West and South ind South East Asia. Perhaps sore leaders will
seek J.essons from the few nations of Latin Americs which do give some evid-
ence of a break-through from stagnation to growth. While these may indeed
be relevant for a few other lands in Latin America, the models will mostly
be those provided by the break-through struggles now in process in India and
China, These two countries alone account for 40 per cent of all the world's
people, for 55 per cent of those in the poorer lands. Both have announced
their determination to begin to expand .. one by obviously totalitarian methods,
the other by procedures involving popular consent.
The record in this "competition" is not yet fully available of course.
But there is by ndw a strong presumption that the Chinese communists are in
fact fulfilling their development aims more effectively. To date, China
7seems much more nearly embarked upon a path of growth than India. The rea-
sons lie less in the application of communist, as distinct from democratic,
processes; they lie more in the common-senses empirical approach to the
problems of 'transition.. in the degree to which the people in charge have
begun to logic at their position and at the types of things which will im-
prove it. In any case, I think we can expect more and more that leaders
in poor lands will be leaning toward China-type programs in order to start
the development ball rolling.
In this possibility certainly iies thie greatest threat confronting
the free world today. It is essential that we recogni z the problem soon
and gear ourselves to resolving it. The fact of our super abundance of
bread-grain, with its obvious importance to the poorer countries, can make
us more receptive to a recognition of this major problem. 1What can we do
to solve it? Can wheat imbalances somehow contribute to actions involving
wheat but far more-AOwhich will help?
U. S. and Western democratic policy objectives will be served only
when nations in whose economic growth we have taken interest do begin to
show progress--or at least begin to manifest changes in savings levels or
sources, in investment patterns or production efficiencies that give pro-
mise of more rapid rates of output increases in the future, There are few
if any underdeveloped countries -- excluding again some tol TAtin America
but not excluding India - -where this can be anticipated today even were
the countries provided with verl much larger amounts of foreign aid. This
is certainly so if we are interested, as we-must be, in such manifestations
of economic change in a reasonably short period.
These countries do need a significant expansion in net imports from
8abroad; estimates which speak of a doubling of the present level of U. S.
loans and grants to underdeveloped countries are certainly not unrealistic
as to need. Of equal importance with increased resources from abroad,
however, is the way available resources are used -- the precise allocations
and the techniques applied. I believe that the United States, for example,
needs to take a responsibility in these programs far beyond what we have
yet done. We must somehow identify ourselves with the foreign country's
desire to grow, These lands must recognize us as a people fundamentally
seeking their economic advance. Insofar zas possible our concern needs to
extend to the entire program in the country and to its broad objectives:--
not only to those particular phases of it in which we apply financial asis-
tance. Clearly, tthis would constitute not i mainal chii in present
U. S. policy implementation in this fieldi but a major break with past
policy and practice0  Perhaps of greater televance, however, it would
require, on the part of the underdeveloped countries, a degree of coopera-
tion and faith in our activitied which few could politically or would in
iny case justifiably manifest. Unless there can be a real pooling of re-
sources of understanding and analysis of thu. economiic pr dsses associated
withi change, progiress--bo say raught of progress in apprettable magnitude
in the near future -- is not likely. These tasks require resources available
in a magnitude and at time Atervals which only the great putential of weal-
thy nations permits. More significantly, perhaps, they require an objectiv-
ity in prescription, a boldness of attack, it which more experience and
detachment are required than can be found in these poorer countries. (And
my remarks about India and China were simpl to say that the Chinese seem to be
looking at their problems with that degree of detachment.)
9Perhap4 I can give these general remarks specific content in the case
of India. While this can serve as a convenient illustrasion, gi~en NW oW
familiarity !with the nation and its econorw, it is more. than just an illuA,
tration, Iri many ways, the success of India's present .development efforts-
is essential if there is to remain the hope, of relativeiV free and open soca
ieties among the new countries of Asia and Africa. Ove'- the next few years,
India's current efforts, under democracy, will be made -aainst the background
of a program in mainland China which seems ilo have taken )hold.
For India to achieve anywhere near the output tar gets specified in its
Second Five Year Plan, now at about halfway mark, India will need from abroad
at least twice the level of net imports (at 'least $3 billion) which India
has officially recuested for the remainder of the Plan period ($1.5 billion
to April 1, 1961). This last sum, it may be observed, is not readily rela-
ted to the original $2.3 billion deficit of tune Plan. India has already been
able to finance, in less than 2 1 years, a net import surplus which is about
as large as the amount originally scheduled for five years. As these facts
suggest, there has been, and still is, ample scope for more careful appraisal
of India's needs for growth than were 'presented in the Plan and in subsequent
official materials. Apart from levels of 'forei gn aid, India will need to
make .a much more concentrated effort than is now in practice or in prospect.
to induce rural change, to .rand the utilization of resources where they
are now available, and to adapt its program to its labor endowments. The
reasons for these gaps a. in resources and in methods.. lie deep in the
character and inst Ltutions of an excolonial land with a leadership elite
trained away from the country. Under these conditions, U. S. policy intera
ests may require more than what the Government of India and its Planning
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Commission alone can do. Nor can the U.S. or other wealthy countries simply
make such recommendations for shifts in emphasis of the requisite order and
character, and expect that their recomendations be adopted. However, given
full cooperation on the part of an India convinced of our desire actually to
on the part
assist in lndia's growth, and/ofte U. S. and other nations actually comitted
to this eno., the needed shifts in emphasis and scope can be appraised and
implemented. It was precisely such an approach to the problem of Indian
development which Senators Kennedy and Cooper had in mind in their recent
resolution. You will remember the emphasis upon overall support by the U.S.
for the achievement of India's original plan objectives; the reference to
significantly larger sums for aid than are currently being presented by
India; and the initiation of multilateral discussions about the test "next
steps."
Our Congress has chosen over the past weeks to pass over this opportunity
to become seriously involved in our overseas development objectives. It is
perhaps sufficient, in a country like ours, that responsible leadership has
begun to recognize the need for -a task so different from what we've ventured
in the past. We can expect that the Senators involved will still resume
their pressure for U.S. action. And it is relevant that the lessons have
not been lost on our administration. Some action can be taken without
congressional action and there may well be beginnings of a new approach
in our aid to India when its officials come here for discussions in the fall.
Once we decide to mode aheac ... as I've argued above,we must decide in
our own fCerign poliy interests--this will have a direct bearing upon the
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utilization of world wheat surpluses. (Parenthetically, I might also mention
that there is the possibility that the unfolding orders of magnitude for growth
in carryovers during 1958/1959 may themselves be an important psychological
stimulant to our decision to make a broader attack upon the problems of growth.)
There will be a need for normal imports, but perhaps on a more generous scale.
More interesting will be the expanded needs which are intimately related to
the process of accelerating overall growth. Here, grain requirements are
part of the direct development assistance. Thus, in such a cooperative pro-
gram in India, we might well discover that 1/4 to 1/3 of India's need for
net imports to spur developmeint over the years to 1961 would be in the form
of wheat. This means at least 300 million bushels of extra shipments in
the next 2i ypars or so. Added to additional requirements in other countries
where the development task will also be tackled, we get a more realistic per-
spective on the adequacy of our carryovers0  "What can we do with our sur-
pluses?" becomes "Will there be enough to meet our essential needs?"
So much then for my views on basic foreign policy developments that will
inevitably bear on our wheat problem. I won't even venture what total orders
of maignitude might be involved; others here have examined this problem with
more care and competence than have I. But I would like to explore, in a gen-
eral way, the relevance of such special needs to the basic and continuing
imbalance in our wheat e conouy. Clearly, they can provide the opportunity
for a significant reduction in our carryovers. But there may also be some
aggravation of what has now become the "normal" wheat problems. Special
needs in such large magnitudes may well inject another price, or type-of-sale,
category into the wheat marketing structure. They raise anew the contrast
with normal imports, and thus provide new opportunities for international
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misunderstandings(s well as domestic differences between our own Departments
of Agriculture and State)as to whose additional market, as to sales of sur-
pluses and dumping, as to foreign tradO policy generally. The case for the
special uses of wheat to meet demands which the market mechanism simply can-
not handle, is a strong one. This situation is, moreover, apt to continue for
many years. And so large is the amount involved relative to normal international
shipments that it seems wise to seek some way through these troublesome issues.- -
for they are side issues, really, despite the heat and intensity with wh- ch
they can be waged.
The world wheat problem may be characterized as one in which produc-
tion seems to outrun effective economic demand for wheat. Consumption has
been increasing, even on a per capita basis. World shipments have grown marx
kedly. But some consumption inoreases and much expansion in trade were "ex-
market". There seems to be broad agreement that effective economic demand
in the forseeable future will not expand vigorously enough to absorb production,
even if output were to come to market at the lowest costs permitted by modern
technology. In this situation, one important prescription calls for produc-
tion declines, especially in the major exporting countries and particularly
in the United States. Lines of policy to this end are reasonably clear cut
on the economic side, but have remained essentially insoluble from the politi-
cal point of view.
Despite a long history of ex-market dismosition programs, and despite an
increasingly complicated system of marketing and price arrangements, production
continues to outpace utilisation. This situation has long prevailed. Without
disparaging 'continued efforts toward some adjustment, I think some degree of
er
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acceptance of the inevitable is in order. Primary focus must be shifted to
more systematic utilization of the ex-market supplies. Again, who knows
but what these may continue to expand--and to our great advantage as citi-
zens of the world' s greatest power as well as !people intimately concerned
with the wheat economy.
There are three categories of demand which need to be considered in
this regard. The first we have already discussed above -- the special ex-
market demands arising in the process of acceleratirg growth. By pro-
viding important parts of total aid in the form of these essential consurP-
tion 'goods, we are providing key components of' the external assistance needed
for development. Now it is true that the poorer areas of the world, our
underdeveloped countries, are pre-eminently those where per capita consumption
of wheat is very low; it is generally of an order less than one bushel pe?
capita per yearo Despite the boon which additional wheat shipments can be
for development and for expanded consumption during the initial stafes, a
key development objective will usually be the expansion of indigenous agricul'-
tural output0 It is inconceivable that these lands (with the usual exceptions
in such a broad observation) become significant market demanders of imported
wheat. Apart from a very small group of well4to-do urban consumers, very
few persons in these lands will lhave personal incomes that permit significant
purchases on the world marketo 11or are governmennt foreign exchange re-
sources apt to warrant large expenditures for food, partidiarly in any hard
currency. It is in the fuller exploitation of the agricultural output pos-
sibilities in most of these nations that their international economic com-
parative advantages lie, at least in the years immediately ahead. Their
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consumption of foodgrains may well expand, but principally from their own
expanded output or from the growth of output in some other underdeveloped
country. In total, therefore, while surplus wheat to meet demands arising
directly from the process of development may permit some liquidation of large
carryovers, such demand seems to hold limited promise for providing new markets.
Second, in the case of some more developed countries--the U.K. and Italy
in Europe, Japan in Asia, for example--installed industrial capacity would
permit larger output if export demand could be increased. But these coun-
tries need to have this increase in demand from hard currency areas, at
least in part, since the expanded output will require various pqrcrases of
foreign inputs in such currencies. In particular, more output 14 increase
domestic incomes and thus the demands for imported what. A considerable-con-
tribution can therefore be made to the imports of industrial prdducts by the
underdeveloped areas from these countries, if the latter could dfford to im-
port breadgrains for this expanded domestic demand at substantially lower costs
in hard currencies than the market now permits.
There may well be greater promise for long-term gains in the economic
demarid for wheat in such less direct efforts directed at achieving our dev-
elopment policy objectives0  There has, in fact, been some experience with
special financing of wheat for this purpose, in our government's efforts
"tto mIltilateralize aid." These activities have recognized the importance of
using more fully the productive capacity of such European and Asian indus-
trial countries; they recognized the greater future complementarity in the
trade flows between underdeveloped countries, on the one hand, and Japan and
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the countries of Western Europe on the other. It will certainly be easier
for these countries to absorb imports from underdeveloped areas than is apt
to be true for the United States especially. With programs which emphasise
these multilateral possibilities it is likely that the expansion in trade and
income will eventually contribute to an actual growth in the international
market demand for wheat. The long run picture in this, regard is certainly
more favorable than in the case of direct demand from the underdeveloped
countries themselves.
Finally, there is the demand for wheat imports from regular participants
in present normal commercial international wheat trade. Involved here a-e
some high income countries which consume relatively low amounts 'of wheat per
capita -Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany- -primarily because they are still
important consumers of nonwheat grains larvely produced indigenously. Other
such countries--France, Belgium and Italy, for example--are high-level
wheat consumers but import less than they might because they prefer to main--
tain what tends to be rather expensive domestic grain output. There are
clear long term advantages for the world economy generally and to the wheat
economy particularly from any program that would provide real encouragement
to these countries to shift their doestic resources into other activities
and gain from the more efficient procuction *rebad. This objective has of
course long been sought, but the actual (or presumed) economic advantages of
greater self-sufficiency in grains have prevailed. A bolder approach seems
warranted -.- involving perhaps some long-period assurances of import supplies
at very attractive prices.
These three important categories of demand for wheat--and jointly they
encompass most of the world's present international wHeat shipments -- need to
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be considered as a whole. None of them is well served by the present divisiOn
of world wheat trade between countries competing to dispose of their
own surpluses (notably Canada and the United States), 'nor by the general
division between commercial and ex-market demands. After all, the so-called
normal imports of poorer areas are "commercial" only so long as we forget
that these countries are areas where economic growth is a fuidamental policy
concern to us, Once we recognize, in the case of such a country, the need
for a balance of international accounts at levels which permit it to pursue
its development targets, the characterization as "commercial" becomes an
arbitrary one. The more of its own foreign exchange resources the country
uses for these commercial purchases, the more development aid it will need
from abroad. Just as a country like India should seek increasingly to pro-
vide for its. extra consumption needs through its own food production, it
should be able to replace in the same way much of what we now consider its
normal imyorts of grain. Actually, there is little reason to distinguish in
the wheat trade with these poorer areas, in a total amount running about 450
million bushels in recent years, the 200 million bushels (and pr9spectively'
much larger quantities) of extra shipments as against what are considered
the normal 'imports of 250 million bushels,
I suggest that there may be real advantages in further consideration
and study of the possibilities for placing all international wheat trade
under public international control, perhaps initially on the part of the
wheat exporting nations alone. The objective should be to provide such
shipments, perhaps at a single low price relative to domestic prices, as a
real inducement for expanded wheat trade and consumption.
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Such pooling would of course put formidable tasks upon the exporters
and importers - tasks which have in part already been assayed in some of the
past discussions bearing on world wheat agreements. Yet, when we recognise
that it is rich countries which are primarily involved in the control and
ownership of wheat carryovers, countries which have a great stake in further-
ing economic progress elsevhere, these problems should be resolvable. There
may be parallels in the blended class prices of milk marketing arrangements.
Nor should we forget the extent to which wheat in the world and particularly
in the United States has already moved away from being the model product of
a free enterprise economy. It now is primarily the child of government.
Public control of international shipments by the governments involved
need not introduce new domestic rigidities, while it could contribute to an
improved international flow and use of wheat.
There is little reason to expect that such action would eliminate wheat's
proclivity toward an imbalance between supply and demand. After all, the
producing nations could separately fix domestic prices, or could otherwise
adopt procedures which would determine the return to their producers* Pooled
international trade will thus not assure the steps which could prevent the
further emergence of new record levels of wheat surpluses* 3ut it could Vell
make more systematic and meaningful the international disposition of these
surpluses. It should improve significantly the role ther play in creating
expanding economies in a world in which most societies remain free and open.
